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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000435

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [MK](#)

SUBJECT: DAS DICARLO DISCUSSES GOVERNMENT FORMATION, NAME
ISSUE, AND KOSOVO RECOGNITION

REF: SKOPJE 394 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: P/E MLATHAM REASONS 1.4(B) & (D)

SUMMARY

[¶1.](#) (C) DAS DiCarlo visited Skopje June 27 and met separately with: Prime Minister Gruevski and FM Milososki; President Crvenkovski; DUI leader Ali Ahmeti; DPA leader Menduh Thaci; SDSM Vice President Jani Makraduli; and name negotiator Dimitrov. Gruevski is in the process of determining whether to include DUI or DPA, or both, in his new governing coalition. DiCarlo told Gruevski that the USG would find it difficult to work with a government coalition that included solely the ethnic-Albanian party that had resorted to election related violence and intimidation (i.e., DPA). She pressed all parties to be flexible on the name negotiations with Greece, but all her interlocutors indicated that U.N. mediator Nimetz's latest proposal was too biased in favor of the Greek position to be accepted in Macedonia. DiCarlo also told her interlocutors that there should be no linkage between demarcation of the border with Kosovo and Macedonia's recognition of Kosovo. Gruevski denied having publicly linked demarcation to recognition, but again raised his concern that the Kosovo government may be unhelpful on demarcating the most troublesome areas. End summary.

Gruevski Choosing Ethnic Albanian Governing Partner

[¶2.](#) (C) Following a parliamentary election that included clear cases of violence, intimidation and fraud in ethnic Albanian communities (reftel), primarily committed by DPA, DiCarlo told Gruevski that the USG would have a hard time working with the GOM if it included solely the political party that had engaged in most of the undemocratic behavior. Gruevski gave no indication which party he intended to invite to join his government, but said that he "fully understood" her message. He said that he hoped to have finalized his decision within ten days, after further discussions with DUI and DPA leaders.

[¶3.](#) (C) DiCarlo also said that she hoped Gruevski's party would be flexible and would include elements of potential eAlbanian partners' priorities in its program. Gruevski replied that he hoped that the ethnic Albanian parties would also be flexible, and noted that the ethnic Albanian parties had shown signs of flexibility in initial discussions. Separately, Ahmeti told DiCarlo that while his discussions with Gruevski were positive, Gruevski had requested DUI make significant concessions, including a slower, phased approach

to implementing the government's use of minority languages, and an amendment to the May 29 Agreement article that requires that any law adopted by Badinter majority be amended by Badinter vote. DiCarlo and the Ambassador urged Ahmeti to make a strong case for DUI's inclusion in the government and to be willing to show flexibility. Thaci told DiCarlo that Gruevski did not want to make any concessions to ethnic-Albanian demands, and was deliberately playing both Albanian parties against each other.

¶4. (C) DiCarlo told Thaci that his actions and statements had helped prevent free and fair elections, and had caused serious concern in Washington. She noted that DPA's actions included the politicization of the Ministry of Interior and the police, as well as ill-founded criticisms of State Electoral Commission and Supreme Court decisions on election irregularities. Thaci admitted that he had not been an "angel" and had caused some problems and embarrassments. However, he also claimed that DPA had faced a DUI political-military structure backed by Kosovar thugs. That had blocked DPA from seriously competing in DUI-controlled districts.

New Name Proposal: Too Pro-Greek

¶5. (C) DAS DiCarlo (who coincidentally visited Macedonia the same day that U.N. name mediator Nimetz visited to present his latest ideas to the GOM) met Crvenkovski and Gruevski shortly before their separate meetings with Nimetz. Crvenkovski was pessimistic that the name dispute could be resolved quickly, given what he saw as a hardening of the

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Greek position, especially after the NATO summit, and Gruevski's insistence that any agreement be subject to a time-consuming referendum process. Gruevski told DiCarlo that Nimetz's latest ideas, presented a few days earlier in New York, had consisted of a 15-page package of issues in which the actual suggestions on the name had been overshadowed by issues of history, antiquity and usage - suggesting that Nimetz was going well beyond his mandate. Gruevski stated that he was virtually certain that Greece would block Macedonia's EU accession progress. Macedonians were "psychologically prepared" for that possibility, he added.

¶6. (C) The GOM's official name negotiator, Nikola Dimitrov, met with DiCarlo after he had attended Crvenkovski's meeting with Nimetz. Dimitrov said that Nimetz's new proposal included various suggested possible geographic modifiers that would be used for all international usage, including bilateral usage with countries that had already recognized Macedonia by its constitutional name. Dimitrov said that this proposal was too biased in favor of the Greek side to be accepted by the GOM. As a result, he was convinced there would be no resolution for at least several months. In the meantime, Dimitrov noted, the GOM would try to do a better job presenting its case on the name dispute to European leaders and media in order to generate greater international support.

Border Demarcation - Kosovo Recognition

¶7. (C) In her meetings DiCarlo noted Macedonia and Kosovo's positive progress on border demarcation, and argued that border demarcation should not be linked to Macedonia's recognition of Kosovo, which should happen soon. Gruevski said that he had made no public linkage between border demarcation and recognition. However, he added that he would face political problems if Kosovars delayed demarcation after the GOM recognized Kosovo. Gruevski also stated, without further explanation, that "the Kosovar government is about to do something to completely destroy the process." Crvenkovski raised his concern that the situation on the ground in Kosovo was creating a de-facto ethnic division that could result in the legal division of Kosovo in the future.

¶8. (C) DiCarlo also asked for Ahmeti's support in keeping Kosovo's leaders moderate on the border demarcation, in order to help both sides reach a rapid demarcation resolution. Ahmeti agreed that DUI would work with the local villagers in the border area to help them accept demarcation. He said that if three "tough points" were demarcated first, Gruevski would be willing to discuss recognition.

¶9. (U) DAS DiCarlo has cleared this cable.
Milovanovic